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Abstract. We revisit the notion of deniability in quantum key exchange
(QKE), a topic that remains largely unexplored. In the only work on this
subject by Donald Beaver, it is argued that QKE is not necessarily deniable
due to an eavesdropping attack that limits key equivocation. We provide more
insight into the nature of this attack and how it extends to other construc-
tions such as QKE obtained from uncloneable encryption. We then adopt the
framework for quantum authenticated key exchange, developed by Mosca et
al., and extend it to introduce the notion of coercer-deniable QKE, formalized
in terms of the indistinguishability of real and fake coercer views. Next, we
apply results from a recent work by Arrazola and Scarani on covert quantum
communication to establish a connection between covert QKE and deniability.
We propose DC-QKE, a simple deniable covert QKE protocol, and prove its
deniability via a reduction to the security of covert QKE. Finally, we consider
how entanglement distillation can be used to enable information-theoretically
deniable protocols for QKE and tasks beyond key exchange.
1 Introduction
Deniability represents a fundamental privacy-related notion in cryptography. The
ability to deny a message or an action is a desired property in many contexts such as
off-the-record communication, anonymous reporting, whistle-blowing and coercion-
resistant secure electronic voting. The concept of non-repudiation is closely related to
deniability in that the former is aimed at associating specific actions with legitimate
parties and thereby preventing them from denying that they have performed a certain
task, whereas the latter achieves the opposite property by allowing legitimate parties
to deny having performed a particular action. For this reason, deniability is sometimes
referred to as repudiability.
The definitions and requirements for deniable exchange can vary depending on
the cryptographic task in question, e.g., encryption, authentication or key exchange.
Roughly speaking, the common underlying idea for a deniable scheme can be under-
stood as the impossibility for an adversary to produce cryptographic proofs, using
only algorithmic evidence, that would allow a third-party, often referred to as a judge,
to decide if a particular entity has either taken part in a given exchange or exchanged
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a certain message, which can be a secret key, a digital signature, or a plaintext mes-
sage. In the context of key exchange, this can be also formulated in terms of a corrupt
party (receiver) proving to a judge that a message can be traced back to the other
party [16].
In the public-key setting, an immediate challenge for achieving deniability is posed
by the need for remote authentication as it typically gives rise to binding evidence,
e.g., digital signatures, see [16,17]. The formal analysis of deniability in classical cryp-
tography can be traced back to the original works of Canetti et al. and Dwork et al. on
deniable encryption [11] and deniable authentication [18], respectively. These led to a
series of papers on this topic covering a relatively wide array of applications. Deniable
key exchange was first formalized by Di Raimondo et al. in [16] using a framework
based on the simulation paradigm, which is closely related to that of zero-knowledge
proofs.
Despite being a well-known and fundamental concept in classical cryptography,
rather surprisingly, deniability has been largely ignored by the quantum cryptography
community. To put things into perspective, with the exception of a single paper by
Donald Beaver [3], and a footnote in [20] commenting on the former, there are no
other works that directly tackle deniable QKE.
In the adversarial setting described in [3], it is assumed that the honest parties are
approached by the adversary after the termination of a QKE session and demanded
to reveal their private randomness, i.e., the raw key bits encoded in their quantum
states. It is then claimed that QKE schemes, despite having perfect and unconditional
security, are not necessarily deniable due to an eavesdropping attack. In the case of the
BB84 protocol, this attack introduces a binding between the parties’ inputs and the
final key, thus constraining the space of the final secret key such that key equivocation
is no longer possible.
Note that since Beaver’s work [3] appeared a few years before a formal analysis
of deniability for key exchange was published, its analysis is partly based on the ad-
versarial model formulated earlier in [11] for deniable encryption. For this reason, the
setting corresponds more closely to scenarios wherein the honest parties try to deceive
a coercer by presenting fake messages and randomness, e.g., deceiving a coercer who
tries to verify a voter’s claimed choice using an intercepted ciphertext of a ballot in
the context of secure e-voting.
1.1 Contributions and Structure
In Section 3 we revisit the notion of deniability in QKE and provide more insight
into the eavesdropping attack aimed at detecting attempts at denial described in [3].
Having shed light on the nature of this attack, we show that while coercer-deniability
can be achieved by uncloneable encryption (UE) [19], QKE obtained from UE remains
vulnerable to the same attack. We briefly elaborate on the differences between our
model and simulation-based deniability [16]. To provide a firm foundation, we adopt
the framework and security model for quantum authenticated key exchange (Q-AKE)
developed by Mosca et al. [24] and extend them to introduce the notion of coercer-
deniable QKE, which we formalize in terms of the indistinguishability of real and fake
coercer views.
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We establish a connection between the concept of covert communication and de-
niability in Section 4, which to the best of our knowledge has not been formally
considered before. More precisely, we apply results from a recent work by Arrazola
and Scarani on obtaining covert quantum communication and covert QKE via noise
injection [1] to propose DC-QKE, a simple construction for coercer-deniable QKE.
We prove the deniability of DC-QKE via a reduction to the security of covert QKE.
Compared to the candidate PQECC protocol suggested in [3] that is claimed to be
deniable, our construction does not require quantum computation and falls within
the more practical realm of prepare-and-measure protocols.
Finally, in Section 5 we consider how quantum entanglement distillation can be
used not only to counter eavesdropping attacks, but also to achieve information-
theoretic deniability. We conclude by presenting some open questions in Section 6.
It is our hope that this work will rekindle interest, more broadly, in the notion of
deniable communication in the quantum setting, a topic that has received very little
attention from the quantum cryptography community.
1.2 Related Work
We focus on some of the most prominent works in the extensive body of work on
deniability in classical cryptography. The notion of deniable encryption was consid-
ered by Canetti et al. [11] in a setting where an adversary demands that parties
reveal private coins used for generating a ciphertext. This motivated the need for
schemes equipped with a faking algorithm that can produce fake randomness with
distributions indistinguishable from that of the real encryption.
In a framework based on the simulation paradigm, Dwork et al. introduced the
notion of deniable authentication [18], followed by the work of Di Raimondo et al. on
the formalization of deniable key exchange [16]. Both works rely on the formalism of
zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs, with definitions formalized in terms of a simulator that
can produce a simulated view that is indistinguishable from the real one. In a subse-
quent work, Di Raimondo and Gennaro gave a formal definition of forward deniability
[15], requiring that indistinguishability remain intact even when a (corrupted) party
reveals real coins after a session. Among other things, they showed that statistical
ZK protocols are forward deniable.
Pass [26] formally defines the notion of deniable zero-knowledge and presents
positive and negative results in the common reference string and random oracle model.
In [17], Dodis et al. establish a link between deniability and ideal authentication and
further model a situation in which deniability should hold even when a corrupted
party colludes with the adversary during the execution of a protocol. They show an
impossibility result in the PKI model if adaptive corruptions are allowed. Cremers
and Feltz introduced another variant for key exchange referred to as peer and time
deniability [13], while also capturing perfect forward secrecy. More recently, Unger
and Goldberg studied deniable authenticated key exchange (DAKE) in the context
of secure messaging [31].
To the best of our knowledge, the only work related to deniability in QKE is a
single paper by Beaver [3], in which the author suggests a negative result arguing
that existing QKE schemes are not necessarily deniable.
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2 Preliminaries in Quantum Information and QKE
We use the Dirac bra-ket notation and standard terminology from quantum comput-
ing. Here we limit ourselves to a description of the most relevant concepts in quan-
tum information theory. More details can be found in standard textbooks [25,32]. For
brevity, let A and B denote the honest parties, and E the adversary.
Given an orthonormal basis formed by |0〉 and |1〉 in a two-dimensional complex
Hilbert space H2, let (+) ≡ {|0〉 , |1〉} denote the computational basis and (×) ≡
{(1/√2)(|0〉+ |1〉), (1/√2)(|0〉 − |1〉)} the diagonal basis.
If the state vector of a composite system cannot be expressed as a tensor product
|ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉, the state of each subsystem cannot be described independently and we
say the two qubits are entangled. This property is best exemplified by maximally
entangled qubits (ebits), the so-called Bell states
∣
∣Φ±
〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|00〉AB ± |11〉AB) ,
∣
∣Ψ±
〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|01〉AB ± |10〉AB)
A noisy qubit that cannot be expressed as a linear superposition of pure states
is said to be in a mixed state, a classical probability distribution of pure states:
{pX(x), |ψx〉}x∈X . The density operator ρ, defined as a weighted sum of projectors,
captures both pure and mixed states: ρ ≡∑x∈X pX(x) |ψx〉 〈ψx|.
Given a density matrix ρAB describing the joint state of a system held by A and
B, the partial trace allows us to compute the local state of A (density operator ρA) if
B’s system is not accessible to A. To obtain ρA from ρAB (the reduced state of ρAB
on A), we trace out the system B: ρA = TrB(ρAB). As a distance measure, we use
the expected fidelity F (|ψ〉 , ρ) between a pure state |ψ〉 and a mixed state ρ given by
F (|ψ〉 , ρ) = 〈ψ| ρ |ψ〉.
A crucial distinction between quantum and classical information is captured by
the well-known No-Cloning theorem [33], which states that an arbitrary unknown
quantum state cannot be copied or cloned perfectly.
2.1 Quantum Key Exchange and Uncloneable Encryption
QKE allows two parties to establish a common secret key with information-theoretic
security using an insecure quantum channel, and a public authenticated classical
channel. In Protocol 1 we describe the BB84 protocol, the most well-known QKE
variant due to Bennett and Brassard [5]. For consistency with related works, we use
the well-established formalism based on error-correcting codes, developed by Shor
and Preskill [28]. Let C1[n, k1] and C2[n, k2] be two classical linear binary codes
encoding k1 and k2 bits in n bits such that {0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 where Fn2 is
the binary vector space on n bits. A mapping of vectors v ∈ C1 to a set of basis
states (codewords) for the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) [10,29] code subspace is
given by: v 7→ (1/√|C2|)∑w∈C2 |v + w〉. Due to the irrelevance of phase errors and
their decoupling from bit flips in CSS codes, Alice can send |v〉 along with classical
error-correction information u + v where u, v ∈ Fn2 and u ∈ C1, such that Bob can
decode to a codeword in C1 from (v+ ǫ)− (u+ v) where ǫ is an error codeword, with
the final key being the coset leader of u+ C2.
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Protocol 1 BB84 for an n-bit key with protection against δn bit errors
1: Alice generates two random bit strings a, b ∈ {0, 1}(4+δ)n, encodes ai into |ψi〉 in basis
(+) if bi = 0 and in (×) otherwise, and ∀i ∈ [1, |a|] sends |ψi〉 to Bob.
2: Bob generates a random bit string b′ ∈ {0, 1}(4+δ)n and upon receiving the qubits,
measures |ψi〉 in (+) or (×) according to b
′
i to obtain a
′
i.
3: Alice announces b and Bob discards a′i where bi 6= b
′
i, ending up with at least 2n bits
with high probability.
4: Alice picks a set p of 2n bits at random from a, and a set q containing n elements of p
chosen as check bits at random. Let v = p \ q.
5: Alice and Bob compare their check bits and abort if the error exceeds a predeﬁned
threshold.
6: Alice announces u+ v, where v is the string of the remaining non-check bits, and u is a
random codeword in C1.
7: Bob subtracts u + v from his code qubits, v + ǫ, and corrects the result, u + ǫ, to a
codeword in C1.
8: Alice and Bob use the coset of u+ C2 as their ﬁnal secret key of length n.
Uncloneable encryption (UE) enables transmission of ciphertexts that cannot
be perfectly copied and stored for later decoding, by encoding carefully prepared
codewords into quantum states, thereby leveraging the No-Cloning theorem. We refer
to Gottesman’s original work [19] for a detailed explanation of the sketch in Protocol 2.
Alice and Bob agree on a message length n, a Message Authentication Code (MAC)
of length s, an error-correcting code C1 having message length K and codeword
length N with distance 2δN for average error rate δ, and another error-correcting
code C2 (for privacy amplification) with message length K
′ and codeword length N
and distance 2(δ + η)N to correct more errors than C1, satisfying C
⊥
2 ⊂ C1, where
C⊥2 is the dual code containing all vectors orthogonal to C2. The pre-shared key is
broken down into four pieces, all chosen uniformly at random: an authentication key
k ∈ {0, 1}s, a one-time pad e ∈ {0, 1}n+s, a syndrome c1 ∈ {0, 1}N−K, and a basis
sequence b ∈ {0, 1}N .
Protocol 2 Uncloneable Encryption for sending a message m ∈ {0, 1}n
1: Compute MAC(m)k = µ ∈ {0, 1}
s. Let x = m||µ ∈ {0, 1}n+s.
2: Mask x with the one-time pad e to obtain y = x⊕ e.
3: From the coset of C1 given by the syndrome c1, pick a random codeword z ∈ {0, 1}
N
that has syndrome bits y w.r.t. C⊥2 , where C
⊥
2 ⊂ C1.
4: For i ∈ [1, N ] encode ciphertext bit zi in the basis (+) if bi = 0 and in the basis (×) if
bi = 1. The resulting state |ψi〉 is sent to Bob.
To perform decryption:
1: For i ∈ [1, N ], measure |ψ′i〉 according to bi, to obtain z
′
i ∈ {0, 1}
N .
2: Perform error-correction on z′ using code C1 and evaluate the parity checks of C2/C
⊥
1
for privacy ampliﬁcation to get an (n+ s)-bit string y′.
3: Invert the OTP step to obtain x′ = y′ ⊕ e.
4: Parse x′ as the concatenation m′||µ′ and use k to verify if MAC(m′)k = µ
′.
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QKE from UE. It is known [19] that any quantum authentication (QA) scheme can
be used as a secure UE scheme, which can in turn be used to obtain QKE, with less
interaction and more efficient error detection. We give a brief description of how QKE
can be obtained from UE in Protocol 3.
Protocol 3 Obtaining QKE from Uncloneable Encryption
1: Alice generates random strings k and x, and sends x to Bob via UE, keyed with k.
2: Bob announces that he has received the message, and then Alice announces k.
3: Bob decodes the classical message x, and upon MAC veriﬁcation, if the message is valid,
he announces this to Alice and they will use x as their secret key.
3 Coercer-Deniable Quantum Key Exchange
Following the setting in [3], in which it is implicitly assumed that the adversary has
established a binding between the participants’ identities and a given QKE session, we
introduce the notion of coercer-deniability for QKE. This makes it possible to consider
an adversarial setting similar to that of deniable encryption [11] and expect that the
parties might be coerced into revealing their private coins after the termination of
a session, in which case they would have to produce fake randomness such that the
resulting transcript and the claimed values remain consistent with the adversary’s
observations.
Beaver’s analysis [3] is briefly addressed in a footnote in a paper by Ioannou and
Mosca [20] and the issue is brushed aside based on the argument that the parties do
not have to keep records of their raw key bits. It is argued that for deniability to
be satisfied, it is sufficient that the adversary cannot provide binding evidence that
attributes a particular key to the classical communication as their measurements on
the quantum channel do not constitute a publicly verifiable proof. However, counter-
arguments for this view were already raised in the motivations for deniable encryption
[11] in terms of secure erasure being difficult and unreliable, and that erasing can-
not be externally verified. Moreover, it is also argued that if one were to make the
physical security assumption that random choices made for encryption are physically
unavailable, the deniability problem would disappear. We refer to [11] and references
therein for more details.
Bindings, or lack thereof, lie at the core of deniability. Although we leave a formal
comparison of our model with the one formulated in the simulation paradigm [16] as
future work, a notable difference can be expressed in terms of the inputs presented
to the adversary. In the simulation paradigm, deniability is modelled only according
to the simulatability of the legal transcript that the adversary or a corrupt party
produces naturally via a session with a party as evidence for the judge, whereas for
coercer-deniability, the adversary additionally demands that the honest parties reveal
their private randomness.
Finally, note that viewing deniability in terms of “convincing” the adversary is
bound to be problematic and indeed a source of debate in the cryptographic research
6 This is a copy of the author preprint. The final authenticated version is available online at:
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community as the adversary may never be convinced given their knowledge of the
existence of faking algorithms. Hence, deniability is formulated in terms of the indis-
tinguishability of views (or their simulatability [16]) such that a judge would have no
reason to believe a given transcript provided by the adversary establishes a binding
as it could have been forged or simulated.
3.1 Defeating Deniability in QKE via Eavesdropping in a Nutshell
We briefly review the eavesdropping attack described in [3] and provide further in-
sight. Suppose Alice sends qubit |ψ〉m,b to Bob, which encodes a single-bit message m
prepared in a basis determined by b ∈ {+,×}. Let Φ(E,m) denote the state obtained
after sending |ψ〉m,b, relayed and possibly modified by an adversary E. Moreover, let
ρ(E,m) denote the view presented to the judge, obtained by tracing over inaccessible
systems. Now for a qubit measured correctly by Eve, if a party tries to deny by pre-
tending to have sent σ1 = ρ(E, 1) instead of σ2 = ρ(E, 0), e.g., by using some local
transformation Uneg to simply negate a given qubit, then F (σ1, σ2) = 0, where F
denotes the fidelity between σ1 and σ2. Thus, the judge can successfully detect this
attempt at denial.
This attack can be mounted successfully with non-negligible probability without
causing the session to abort: Assume that N qubits will be transmitted in a BB84
session and that the tolerable error rate is η
N
, where clearly η ∼ N . Eve measures each
qubit with probability η
N
(choosing a basis at random) and passes on the remaining
ones to Bob undisturbed, i.e., she plants a number of decoy states proportional to
the tolerated error threshold. On average, η2 measurements will come from matching
bases, which can be used by Eve to detect attempts at denial, if Alice claims to have
measured a different encoding. After discarding half the qubits in the sifting phase,
this ratio will remain unchanged. Now Alice and/or Bob must flip at least one bit
in order to deny without knowledge of where the decoy states lie in the transmitted
sequence, thus getting caught with probability η2N upon flipping a bit at random.
3.2 On the Coercer-Deniability of Uncloneable Encryption
The vulnerability described in Section 3.1 is made possible by an eavesdropping attack
that induces a binding in the key coming from a BB84 session. Uncloneable encryption
remains immune to this attack because the quantum encoding is done for an already
one-time padded classical input. More precisely, a binding established at the level of
quantum states can still be perfectly denied because the actual raw information bits
m are not directly encoded into the sequence of qubits, instead the concatenation of
m and the corresponding authentication tag µ = MACk(m), i.e., x = m||µ, is masked
with a one-time pad e to obtain y = x ⊕ e, which is then mapped onto a codeword
z that is encoded into quantum states. For this reason, in the context of coercer-
deniability, regardless of a binding established on z by the adversary, Alice can still
deny to another input message in that she can pick a different input x′ = m′||µ′ to
compute a fake pad e′ = y ⊕ x′, so that upon revealing e′ to Eve, she will simply
decode y ⊕ e′ = x′, as intended.
This is a copy of the author preprint. The final authenticated version is available online at:
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However, note that a prepare-and-measure QKE obtained from UE still remains
vulnerable to the same eavesdropping attack due to the fact that we can no longer
make use of the deniability of the one-time pad in UE such that the bindings induced
by Eve constrain the choice of the underlying codewords.
3.3 Security Model
We adopt the framework for quantum AKEs developed by Mosca et al. [24]. Due to
space constraints, we mainly focus on our proposed extensions. Parties, including the
adversary, are modelled as a pair of classical and quantum Turing machines (TM) that
execute a series of interactive computations and exchange messages with each other
through classical and quantum channels, collectively referred to as a protocol. An
execution of a protocol is referred to as a session, identified with a unique session
identifier. An ongoing session is called an active session, and upon completion, it
either outputs an error term ⊥ in case of an abort, or it outputs a tuple (sk, pid,v,u)
in case of a successful termination. The tuple consists of a session key sk, a party
identifier pid and two vectors u and v that model public values and secret terms,
respectively.
We adopt an extended version of the adversarial model described in [24], to
account for coercer-deniability. Let E be an efficient, i.e. (quantum) polynomial time,
adversary with classical and quantum runtime bounds tc(k) and tq(k), and quantum
memory bound mq(k), where bounds can be unlimited. Following standard assump-
tions, the adversary controls all communication between parties and carries the mes-
sages exchanged between them. We consider an authenticated classical channel and
do not impose any special restrictions otherwise. Additionally, the adversary is al-
lowed to approach either the sender or the receiver after the termination of a session
and request access to a subset r ⊆ v of the private randomness used by the parties
for a given session, i.e. set of values to be faked.
Security notions can be formulated in terms of security experiments in which
the adversary interacts with the parties via a set of well-defined queries. These
queries typically involve sending messages to an active session or initiating one, cor-
rupting a party, learning their long-term secret key, revealing the ephemeral keys of
an incomplete session, obtaining the computed session key for a given session, and
a test-session(id) query capturing the winning condition of the game that can be
invoked only for a fresh session. Revealing secret values to the adversary is modeled
via partnering. The notion of freshness captures the idea of excluding cases that
would allow the adversary to trivially win the security experiment. This is done by
imposing minimal restrictions on the set of queries the adversary can invoke for a
given session such that there exist protocols that can still satisfy the definition of
session-key security. A session remains fresh as long as at least one element in u and
v remains secret, see [24] for more details.
The transcript of a protocol consists of all publicly exchanged messages between
the parties during a run or session of the protocol. The definition of “views” and
“outputs” given in [3] coincides with that of transcripts in [16] in the sense that it
allows us to model a transcript that can be obtained from observations made on the
quantum channel. The view of a party P consists of their state in HP along with any
8 This is a copy of the author preprint. The final authenticated version is available online at:
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classical strings they produce or observe. More generally, for a two-party protocol,
captured by the global density matrix ρAB for the systems of A and B, the individual
system A corresponds to a partial trace that yields a reduced density matrix, i.e.,
ρA = TrB(ρAB), with a similar approach for any additional couplings.
3.4 Coercer-Deniable QKE via View Indistinguishability
We use the security model in Section 3.3 to introduce the notion of coercer-deniable
QKE, formalized via the indistinguishability of real and fake views. Note that in this
work we do not account for forward deniability and forward secrecy.
Coercer-Deniability Security Experiment. Let CoercerDenQKEΠE,C(κ) denote this ex-
periment and Q the same set of queries available to the adversary in a security game
for session-key security, as described in Section 3.3, and [24]. Clearly, in addition to
deniability, it is vital that the security of the session key remains intact as well. For
this reason, we simply extend the requirements of the security game for a session-key
secure KE by having the challenger C provide an additional piece of information to
the adversary E when the latter calls the test-session() query. This means that
the definition of a fresh session remains the same as the one given in [24]. E invokes
queries from Q \ {test-session()} until E issues test-session() to a fresh session of
their choice. C decides on a random bit b and if b = 0, C provides E with the real
session key k and the real vector of private randomness r, and if b = 1, with a random
(fake) key k′ and a random (fake) vector of private randomness r′. Finally, E guesses
an output b′ and wins the game if b = b′. The experiment returns 1 if E succeeds,
and 0 otherwise. Let AdvΠE (κ) = |Pr[b = b′] − 1/2| denote the winning advantage of
E.
Definition 1 (Coercer-Deniable QKE). For adversary E, let there be an efficient
distinguisher DE on security parameter κ. We say that Πr is a coercer-deniable QKE
protocol if, for any adversary E, transcript t, and for any k, k′, and a vector of
private random inputs r = (r1, . . . , rℓ), there exists a denial/faking program FA,B that
running on (k, k′, t, r) produces r′ = (r′1, . . . , r
′
ℓ) such that the following conditions
hold:
– Π is a secure QKE protocol.
– The adversary E cannot do better than making a random guess for winning the
coercer-deniability security experiment, i.e., AdvΠE (κ) ≤ negl(κ)
Pr[CoercerDenQKEΠE,C(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(κ)
Equivalently, we require that for all efficient distinguisher DE
|Pr[DE(ViewReal(k, t, r)) = 1]− Pr[DE(ViewFake(k′, t, r′)) = 1]| ≤ negl(κ),
where the transcript t = (c, ρE(k)) is a tuple consisting of a vector c, containing
classical message exchanges of a session, along with the local view of the adversary
w.r.t. the quantum channel obtained by tracing over inaccessible systems (see Section
3.3).
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A function f : N → R is negligible if for any constant k, there exists a Nk such
that ∀N ≥ Nk, we have f(N) < N−k. In other words, it approaches zero faster than
any polynomial in the asymptotic limit.
Remark 1. We introduced a vector of private random inputs r to avoid being re-
stricted to a specific set of “fake coins” in a coercer-deniable setting such as the raw
key bits in BB84 as used in Beaver’s analysis. This allows us to include other private
inputs as part of the transcript that need to be forged by the denying parties without
having to provide a new security model for each variant. Indeed, in [24], Mosca et al.
consider the security of QKE in case various secret values are compromised before
or after a session. This means that these values can, in principle, be included in the
set of random coins that might have to be revealed to the adversary and it should
therefore be possible to generate fake alternatives using a faking algorithm.
4 Deniable QKE via Covert Quantum Communication
We establish a connection between covert communication and deniability by providing
a simple construction for coercer-deniable QKE using covert QKE. We then show that
deniability is reduced to the covertness property, meaning that deniable QKE can be
performed as long as covert QKE is not broken by the adversary, formalized via the
security reduction given in Theorem 2.
Covert communication becomes relevant when parties wish to keep the very act
of communicating secret or hidden from a malicious warden. This can be motivated
by various requirements such as the need for hiding one’s communication with a par-
ticular entity when this act alone can be incriminating. While encryption can make it
impossible for the adversary to access the contents of a message, it would not prevent
them from detecting exchanges over a channel under their observation. Bash et al.
[2,27] established a square-root law for covert communication in the presence of an
unbounded quantum adversary stating that O(√n) covert bits can be exchanged over
n channel uses. Recently, Arrazola and Scarani [1] extended covert communication
to the quantum regime for transmitting qubits covertly. Covert quantum communi-
cation consists of two parties exchanging a sequence of qubits such that an adversary
trying to detect this cannot succeed by doing better than making a random guess, i.e.,
Pd ≤ 12 + ǫ for sufficiently small ǫ > 0, where Pd denotes the probability of detection
and ǫ the detection bias.
4.1 Covert Quantum Key Exchange
Since covert communication requires pre-shared secret randomness, a natural question
to ask is whether QKE can be done covertly. This was also addressed in [1] and it
was shown that covert QKE with unconditional security for the covertness property
is impossible because the amount of key consumption is greater than the amount
produced. However, a hybrid approach involving pseudo-random number generators
(PRNG) was proposed to achieve covert QKE with a positive key rate such that the
resulting secret key remains information-theoretically secure, while the covertness of
10 This is a copy of the author preprint. The final authenticated version is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03638-6_7
A. Atashpendar et al.
QKE is shown to be at least as strong as the security of the PRNG. The PRNG is
used to expand a truly random pre-shared key into an exponentially larger pseudo-
random output, which is then used to determine the time-bins for sending signals in
covert QKE.
Covert QKE Security Experiment. Let CovertQKEΠ
cov
E,C (κ) denote the security ex-
periment. The main property of covert QKE, denoted by Πcov, can be expressed
as a game played by the adversary E against a challenger C who decides on a ran-
dom bit b and if b = 0, C runs Πcov, otherwise (if b = 1), C does not run Πcov.
Finally, E guesses a random bit b′ and wins the game if b = b′. The experiment
outputs 1 if E succeeds, and 0 otherwise. The winning advantage of E is given by
AdvΠ
cov
E (κ) = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| and we want that AdvΠ
cov
E (κ) ≤ negl(κ).
Definition 2. Let G : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}g(s) be a (τ, ǫ)-PRNG secure against all effi-
cient distinguishers D running in time at most τ with success probability at most ǫ,
where ∀s : g(s) > s. A QKE protocol ΠcovG is considered to be covert if the following
holds for any efficient adversary E:
– ΠcovG is a secure QKE protocol.
– The probability that E guesses the bit b correctly (b′ = b), i.e., E manages to
distinguish between Alice and Bob running ΠcovG or not, is no more than
1
2 plus
a negligible function in the security parameter κ, i.e.,
Pr[CovertQKEΠ
cov
E,C (κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(κ)
Theorem 1. (Sourced from [1]) The secret key obtained from the covert QKE proto-
col ΠcovG is informational-theoretically secure and the covertness of Π
cov
G is as secure
as the underlying PRNG.
4.2 Deniable Covert Quantum Key Exchange (DC-QKE)
We are now in a position to describe DC-QKE, a simple construction shown in Pro-
tocol 4, which preserves unconditional security for the final secret key, while its de-
niability is as secure as the underlying PRNG used in Πcov
r,G. In terms of the Security
Experiment 3.4, Πcov
r,G is run to establish a real key k, while non-covert QKE Πr′ is
used to produce a fake key k′ aimed at achieving deniability, where r and r′ are the
respective vectors of real and fake private inputs.
Operationally, consider a setting wherein the parties suspect in advance that they
might be coerced into revealing their private coins for a given run: their joint strategy
consists of running both components in Protocol 4 and claiming to have employed
Πr′ to establish the fake key k
′ using the fake private randomness r′ (e.g. raw key
bits in BB84) and provide these as input to the adversary upon termination of a
session. Thus, for Eve to be able to produce a proof showing that the revealed values
are fake, she would have to break the security of covert QKE to detect the presence
of Πcov
r,G, as shown in Theorem 2. Moreover, note that covert communication can be
used for dynamically agreeing on a joint strategy for denial, further highlighting its
relevance for deniability.
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Protocol 4 DC-QKE for an n-bit key
1: RandGen: Let r = (r1, . . . , rℓ) be the vector of private random inputs, where
ri←${0, 1}
|ri|.
2: KeyGen: Run Πcov
r,G to establish a random secret key k ∈ {0, 1}
n.
Non-covert faking component FA,B :
1: FakeRandGen: Let r′ = (r′1, . . . , r
′
ℓ) be the vector of fake private random inputs, where
r′i←${0, 1}
|r′
i
|.
2: FakeKeyGen: Run Π
r
′ to establish a separate fake key k′ ∈ {0, 1}n.
Remark 2. The original analysis in [3] describes an attack based solely on revealing
fake raw key bits that may be inconsistent with the adversary’s observations. An
advantage of DC-QKE in this regard is that Alice’s strategy for achieving coercer-
deniability consists of revealing all the secret values of the non-covert QKE Πr′
honestly. This allows her to cover the full range of private randomness that could be
considered in different variants of deniability as discussed in Remark 1. A potential
drawback is the extra cost induced by FA,B, which could, in principle, be mitigated
using a less interactive solution such as QKE via UE.
Remark 3. If the classical channel is authenticated by an information-theoretically se-
cure algorithm, the minimal entropy overhead in terms of pre-shared key (logarithmic
in the input size) for Π can be generated by Πcov
r
.
Example 1. In the case of encryption, A can send c = m ⊕ k over a covert channel
to B, while for denying to m′, she can send c′ = m′ ⊕ k′ over a non-covert channel.
Alternatively, she can transmit a single ciphertext over a non-covert channel such
that it can be opened to two different messages. To do so, given c = m ⊕ k, Alice
computes k′ = m′⊕ c = m′⊕m⊕k, and she can then either encode k′ as a codeword,
as described in Section 2.1, and run Πr′ via uncloneable encryption, thus allowing
her to reveal the entire transcript to Eve honestly, or she can agree with Bob on a
suitable privacy amplification (PA) function (with PA being many-to-one) as part of
their denying program in order to obtain k′.
Theorem 2. If Πcov
r,G is a covert QKE protocol, then DC-QKE given in Protocol 4 is
a coercer-deniable QKE protocol that satisfies Definition 1.
Proof. The main idea consists of showing that breaking the deniability property
of DC-QKE amounts to breaking the security of covert QKE, such that coercer-
deniability follows from the contrapositive of this implication, i.e., if there exists no
efficient algorithm for compromising the security of covert QKE, then there exists no
efficient algorithm for breaking the deniability of DC-QKE. We formalize this via a re-
duction, sketched as follows. Let w′ = ViewFake(k′, tE , r′) and w = ViewReal(k, tE , r)
denote the two views. Flip a coin b for an attempt at denial: if b = 0, then tE = (t
′,∅),
else (b = 1), tE = (t
′, tcov), where tcov and t′ denote the transcripts of covert and
non-covert exchanges from Πcov
r,G and Πr′ . Now if DC-QKE is constructed from Π
cov,
then given an efficient adversary E that can distinguish w from w′ with probability
p1, we can use E to construct an efficient distinguisher D to break the security of
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covert QKE with probability p2 such that p1 ≤ p2. Indeed, given an instance of a
DC-QKE security game, we construct a distinguisher D that uses E on input w and
w′, with the goal to win the game described in the Security Experiment 3.4. The
distinguisher D would simply run E (with negligible overhead) and observe whether
E succeeds at distinguishing w from w′. Since the only element that is not sampled
uniformly at random is in tcov containing exchanges from the covert channel, which
relies on a PRNG, the only way E can distinguish w from w′ is if she can distinguish
(t′, tcov) from (t′,∅). If E succeeds, then D guesses that a covert QKE session has
taken place, thereby winning the Security Experiment 4.1 for covert QKE. ⊓⊔
5 Deniability via Entanglement Distillation
Here we consider the possibility of achieving information-theoretic deniability via
entanglement distillation (ED). In its most general form, ED allows two parties
to distill maximally entangled pure states (ebits) from an arbitrary sequence of
entangled states at some positive rate using local operations and classical com-
munication (LOCC), i.e. to move from |Φθ〉AB ≡ cos(θ) |00〉AB + sin(θ) |11〉AB to
|Φ+〉AB = 1√2 (|00〉AB + |11〉AB), where 0 < θ < π/2.
In the noiseless model, n independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) copies of the
same partially entangled state ρ can be converted into ≈ nH(ρ) Bell pairs in the
limit n → ∞, i.e., from ρ⊗nAB to |Φ+〉⊗nH(ρ)AB , where H(ρ) = −Tr(ρlnρ) denotes the
von Neumann entropy of entanglement. If the parties start out with pure states,
local operations alone will suffice for distillation [4,7], otherwise the same task can
be achieved via forward classical communication (one-way LOCC), as shown by the
Devetak-Winter theorem [14], to distill ebits from many copies of some bipartite
entangled state. See also the early work of Bennett et al. [8] on mixed state ED.
Buscemi and Datta [9] relax the i.i.d. assumption and provide a general formula for
the optimal rate at which ebits can be distilled from a noisy and arbitrary source of
entanglement via one-way and two-way LOCC.
Intuitively, the eavesdropping attack described in [3] and further detailed in Sec-
tion 3.1, is enabled by the presence of noise in the channel as well as the fact that
Bob cannot distinguish states sent by Alice from those prepared by Eve. As a result,
attempting to deny to a different bit value encoded in a given quantum state - with-
out knowing if this is a decoy state prepared by Eve - allows the adversary to detect
such an attempt with non-negligible probability.
In terms of deniability, the intuition behind this idea is that while Alice and Bob
may not be able to know which states have been prepared by Eve, they can instead
remove her “check” decoy states from their set of shared entangled pairs by decoupling
her system from theirs. Once they are in possession of maximally entangled states,
they will have effectively factored out Eve’s state such that the global system is given
by the pure tensor product space |Ψ+〉AB⊗|φ〉E . Thus the pure bipartite joint system
between Alice and Bob cannot be correlated with any system under Eve’s control,
thereby foiling her cross-checking strategy. The singlet states can then be used to
perform QKE via quantum teleportation [6].
This is a copy of the author preprint. The final authenticated version is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03638-6_7
13
Revisiting Deniability in Quantum Key Exchange
5.1 Deniable QKE via Entanglement Distillation and Teleportation
We now argue why performing randomness distillation at the quantum level, thus
requiring quantum computation, plays an important role w.r.t. deniability. The sub-
tleties alluded to in [3] arise from the fact that randomness distillation is performed in
the classical post-processing step. This allows Eve to leverage her tampering in that
she can verify the parties’ claims against her decoy states. However, this attack can
be countered by removing Eve’s knowledge before the classical exchanges begin. Most
security proofs of QKE [22,28,23] are based on a reduction to an entanglement-based
variant, such that the fidelity of Alice and Bob’s final state with |Ψ+〉⊗m is shown to
be exponentially close to 1. Moreover, secret key distillation techniques involving ED
and quantum teleportation [7,14] can be used to faithfully transfer qubits from A to B
by consuming ebits. To illustrate the relevance of distillation for deniability in QKE,
consider the generalized template shown in Protocol 5, based on these well-known
techniques.
Protocol 5 Template for deniable QKE via entanglement distillation and teleportation
1: A and B share n noisy entangled pairs (assume i.i.d. states for simplicity).
2: They perform entanglement distillation to convert them into a state ρ such that
F (
∣
∣Ψ+
〉⊗m
, ρ) is arbitrarily close to 1 where m < n.
3: Perform veriﬁcation to make sure they share m maximally entangled states
∣
∣Ψ+
〉⊗m
,
and abort otherwise.
4: A prepares m qubits (e.g. BB84 states) and performs quantum teleportation to send
them to B at the cost of consuming m ebits and exchanging 2m classical bits.
5: A and B proceed with standard classical distillation techniques to agree on a key based
on their measurements.
By performing ED, Alice and Bob make sure that the resulting state cannot
be correlated with anything else due to the monogamy of entanglement (see e.g.
[21,30]), thus factoring out Eve’s system. The parties can open their records for
steps (2) and (3) honestly, and open to arbitrary classical inputs for steps (3), (4)
and (5): deniability follows from decoupling Eve’s system, meaning that she is faced
with a reduced density matrix on a pure bipartite maximally entangled state, i.e., a
maximally mixed state ρE = I/2, thus obtaining key equivocation.
In terms of the hierarchy of entanglement-based constructions mentioned in [3],
this approach mainly constitutes a generalization of such schemes. It should therefore
be viewed more as a step towards a theoretical characterization of entanglement-based
schemes for achieving information-theoretic deniability. Due to lack of space, we omit
a discussion of how techniques from device-independent cryptography can deal with
maliciously prepared initial states.
Going beyond QKE, note that quantum teleportation allows the transfer of an
unknown quantum state, meaning that even the sender would be oblivious as to what
state is sent. Moreover, ebits can enable uniquely quantum tasks such as traceless ex-
change in the context of quantum anonymous transmission [12], to achieve incoercible
protocols that allow parties to deny to any random input.
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6 Open Questions and Directions for Future Research
Studying the deniability of public-key authenticated QKE both in our model and in
the simulation paradigm, and the existence of an equivalence relation between our
indistinguishability-based definition and a simulation-based one would be a natural
continuation of this work. Other lines of inquiry include forward deniability, deniable
QKE in conjunction with forward secrecy, deniability using covert communication in
stronger adversarial models, a further analysis of the relation between the impossibil-
ity of unconditional quantum bit commitment and deniability mentioned in [3], and
deniable QKE via uncloneable encryption. Finally, gaining a better understanding of
entanglement distillation w.r.t. potential pitfalls in various adversarial settings and
proposing concrete deniable protocols for QKE and other tasks beyond key exchange
represent further research avenues.
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